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Abstract
This essay argues that it is not a good idea to propose 
keywords to help find the “essence” of Japanese law. In fact, 
such an approach may well be the problem as we search for a 
single lens with which to analyze a complex society. Our 
perceptions of Japan, related to both exaggerated views of early 
postwar success and subsequent failure and to a preoccupation 
with cultural explanations, may hinder, rather than aid, careful 
analysis of Japanese law and its impact on society. 
This essay instead proposes that we treat Japan as a 
“normal” country that has both similarities to and differences 
with other advanced societies. Those with expertise and 
experience in Japan can contribute to the understanding of 
Japan by supplying the Japanese context in which law operates.
Many of the problems of perceptions and stereotypes that 
involve Japanese law and society are also shared with China 
and other Asian and non-Western societies. Japanese law 
scholars should also make greater efforts to collaborate with 
other Asian law scholars to counter exaggerated cultural 
perceptions and to increase understanding of their work among 
general legal comparativists and the general public.
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INTRODUCTION
When presented with the provocative challenge of providing a 
“keyword” for understanding Japanese law, most participants at 
a conference on Japanese law at Doshisha University presented 
papers on some aspect of their main disciplinary field of 
research. However, having recently taught a broad survey course 
on Japanese law at both the Tokyo campus of Temple University 
and at the University of Washington, I took the conference 
organizer’s charge literally. Rather than make another 
presentation in my field of corporate governance with a focus on 
Japan, I gave serious thought to the field of Japanese law as a 
whole. My conclusion is that it is a terrible idea to provide a 
keyword for understanding Japanese law.
My thinking was affected by a recent experience in which I 
gave a lecture in Tokyo to a visiting group of American 
undergraduate students who were taking an introductory course 
on Japan. What, they ultimately wanted to know, was a good 
way to characterize Japan’s “essence?” They had read various 
articles emphasizing themes such as miniaturization, 
Confucianism, social relations, and others. Which provided the 
best “key” for understanding Japanese society?
My response was that maybe we should not be looking for a 
“grand principle.” Perhaps our search to define some “essence”
is, in fact, the problem. We already spend too much time and 
effort on, and give too much credence to, broad generalizations 
that often overwhelm, rather than aid, careful analysis. It 
becomes difficult for the many well-done comparative studies 
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with a focus on Japan, particularly in the field of law, to have a 
broad impact due to two old problems involving “grand 
perceptions” about Japanese society and law that turn out, in 
fact, to be false dichotomies.
I. TWO “GRAND PERCEPTIONS” ABOUT JAPANESE
LAW
A. Perceptions of Success or Failure
The rise and fall of Japan is generally seen as being quite 
dramatic. We have been fascinated by the economic miracle of 
the 1960s through 1980s, during which time Japan became the 
first non-Western country to modernize successfully. We 
attributed many exaggerated virtues to this economic success, 
including a well-conceived, consistent economic plan1 leading to 
the image of “Japan, Inc.;” brilliant government bureaucrats who 
utilized “administrative guidance”2 to create a new government-
led “variety of capitalism;”3 and supposedly unique cultural 
traits, such as cooperation and consensus, that spurred success.
1. See, e.g., Laura Hein, Growth Versus Success: Japan’s Economic 
Policy in Historical Perspective, in POSTWAR JAPAN AS HISTORY 99, 105-06
(Andrew Gordon ed., 1993).
2. See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 
(1982). Although formulations differ, administrative guidance is generally 
described as government agencies obtaining informal cooperation from 
industries, companies or individuals to take or refrain from taking some action. 
See generally, Mitsuo Matsushita, The Legal Framework of Trade and 
Investment in Japan, 27 HARV. INT’L L.J. 361, 376 (1986). There is no clear 
definition of administrative guidance, as attempts to formulate a legal definition 
often wind up characterizing it by what it is not--it is not formal administrative 
action (i.e., “shobun” or disposition)--which would be subject to judicial 
review. See generally John O. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law, 19 LAW IN 
JAPAN 1 (1986).
3. Business school faculty speculated in the “varieties of capitalism” 
literature whether a Japanese “government-coordinated economy” could 
transform into a “liberal market economy.” See Richard Deeg & Gregory 
Jackson, Toward a More Dynamic Theory of Capitalist Variety, 5 SOCIO-
ECONOMIC REV. 149 (2007).
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Many Americans also lauded Japan’s social successes in its 
dealings with the problems of modern society. Low crime rates, 
high literacy rates, lack of corruption, longevity, relatively equal 
distribution of income, and other social factors led to the thesis 
of “Japan as Number One,” a country that had surpassed the 
United States.4 Holding up a mirror to Japan’s successes 
reflected shortcomings and dissatisfaction with our own society, 
in which the best and the brightest became lawyers rather than 
engineers and our overly adversarial legal system resulted in a 
“litigation explosion.”5
However, Japan’s “unique” success, at least in our minds, was 
soon followed by an equally unique failure, brought about by the 
bursting of Japan’s economic bubble in the early 1990s and two 
subsequent decades of low economic growth. Japan’s social 
successes, which largely remained intact during this long period
of slow growth, were now ignored.6 Holding up our mirror, we 
now saw a vibrant U.S. postindustrial model that we regarded as 
a global standard, and a stagnant Japan that talked about reform 
but seemingly remained unwilling to get “serious” about it 
despite the proven success of the U.S. model. Ironically, two of 
the factors previously cited as key to Japan’s success—the 
ability of its government bureaucracy and its “unique” culture—
were now seen as important causes of stagnation and failure.
Both Japan’s unprecedented “success” and “failure” were 
exaggerated and oversimplified. More importantly, these strong 
perceptions and assumptions about success and failure made 
careful analysis of Japan difficult, as it became nearly impossible 
4. EZRA K. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA
(1979).
5. See, e.g., Derek Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and 
Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570 (1983); Russell Baker, Observer; Lawyers for 
Cars, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1983, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1983
/06/08/opinion/observer-lawyers-for-cars.html.
6. See, e.g., John O. Haley, Why Study Japanese Law? 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 1, 2 (2010) (arguing that despite the recent trend of declaring Japan 
a failure, “measured by any standard of well being” Japan remains a great 
success, and the contribution of law to such success is a worthy object of 
study).
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to argue against the then-prevailing view, at least with a general 
audience. This pendulum swing from exaggerated views of 
success to those of failure is obvious in many areas, including 
my own field of comparative corporate governance. Its birth as a 
field in the early 1990s began as American scholars sought to 
study the secrets of Japan’s success.7
A decade later the overwhelming theme of comparative 
corporate governance literature was the nearly opposite idea of 
convergence, i.e., that globalization and competition would 
result in systems in industrialized countries converging to 
approximate an American corporate governance system that was 
now seen as the best system and as the global standard.8
Arguably, Japan was correspondingly judged by the extent to 
which it transformed to something resembling the U.S. model.9
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it did not receive high marks.10
7. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate 
Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991) (developing a theory of path 
dependence that emphasized how political and historic factors kept corporate 
governance systems on separate paths, in part to explain why, unlike in Japan 
or Germany, powerful financial institutions did not play a significant role in 
U.S. corporate governance); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding 
the Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 
YALE L. J. 871 (1993) (attributing Japan’s “success” in corporate governance to 
embedding good governance practices into its industrial structure in the 
supposed absence of developed legal mechanisms). Curtis Milhaupt described 
the prevailing view of the role of law in Japanese corporate governance as 
being “conspicuous by its absence.” See Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational 
Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule of 
Law, 37 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 3, 4 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of 
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (advocating convergence).
9. For a discussion of the shortcomings of utilizing an “all-or-nothing”
transformational standard see, e.g., Bruce E. Aronson, Changes in the Role of 
Lawyers and Corporate Governance in Japan—How Do We Measure Whether 
Legal Reform Leads to Real Change?, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 223 
(2009). In recent years work in comparative corporate governance has moved 
beyond convergence-based “all-or-nothing” transformational standards for 
evaluating corporate governance reform in Japan. For the forerunners of this 
trend, see, e.g., Luke Nottage et al., Introduction: Japan’s Gradual
Transformation in Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 
21ST CENTURY: JAPAN’S GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION 1 (Luke Nottage et al. 
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One might expect that this image of Japan as a failure would 
have disappeared following the 2008 financial crisis. Many 
industrial countries now experience similar problems to those 
encountered by Japan, including persistent low economic growth 
and rapidly mounting government debt, and similarly struggle to 
find effective solutions to these problems.11 Although Japan’s
misery now has much company and this is generally 
acknowledged, it nevertheless is surprising to see the extent to 
which the perception of Japan as a failure lingers. One wonders 
if Abenomics might make a difference, and whether it is still a 
question of exaggerated popular images of Japan rather than 
actual economic and social conditions within the country.
eds,., 2008) (arguing that corporate governance reform in Japan, as elsewhere, 
is typically a process of evolutionary change rather than sudden, transformative 
change); CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM:
WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008) (viewing corporate governance 
systems, including, in chapter 5, that of Japan, with an eye towards law’s 
adaptability rather than on fixed attributes or traditional classifications, and 
categorizing law based on the organization of legal systems (centralized vs. 
decentralized) and the functions attributed to law (coordinative vs. protective)).
10. Based partly on an assumption of convergence and partly on 
holding Japan to its own free market, reformist rhetoric, law specialists looked 
for a transformation in Japanese corporate governance from a stakeholder-
based system to a shareholder-based system. For one of the best studies to 
measure change based on a criteria of increased emphasis on maximization of 
shareholder wealth, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Lost Decade for Japanese 
Corporate Governance Reform?: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why, in
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN JAPAN 97 (Magnus Blomstrom & Sumner La Croix 
eds., 2006). The same result was also reached from a broader perspective. See, 
e.g., John O. Haley, Heisei Renewal or Heisei Transformation: Are Legal 
Reforms Really Changing Japan?, 19 J. JAPANESE L. 5 (2005).
11. For one of the first serious discussions in the United States of the 
possibility that following the 2008 financial crisis America might repeat 
Japan’s experience of slow growth within a lingering deflationary environment, 
see James Bullard, Seven Faces of “The Peril,” FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV.
1 (Sept.-Oct. 2010).
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B. Preoccupation with Cultural Explanations
There are a number of reasons for the longstanding emphasis 
on cultural explanations in discussions of Japanese society and 
the corresponding view that “law doesn’t matter.” It is 
understandable that the first non-Western society to successfully 
modernize would attract both attention and a search for its 
“secrets.” Many of these supposed “secrets” involved broad 
cultural attributions that would have been impossible to utilize 
outside of Japan. Regardless of whether this cultural emphasis 
was accurate or useful, it was certainly popular and sold many 
books and newspapers.
This cultural emphasis was reinforced by modernization 
theory, which was popular in the early postwar years.12
Modernization theory defined a single path to development and 
encouraged both foreign and Japanese commentators to compare 
Japan’s development at that time to the “goal” of 
modernization.13 This view is reflected in the work of the most
famous Japanese professor of sociology of law, Takeyoshi 
Kawashima, who in 1963 found that Japanese cultural traditions 
12. See, e.g., W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A
NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (3d ed. 1990) (positing a single linear path of 
development consisting of five stages of economic growth for all countries to 
develop from “the traditional” society” to the ultimate “high mass-
consumption” society). 
13. Modernization theory’s implication for the importance of law is 
that as society develops economically and becomes more complex over time, 
formal “Western-style” legal systems will assume greater importance over the 
informal dispute resolution mechanisms that are prevalent in “traditional” 
societies. See TAKEYOSHI KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO Hƿ,6+,., [LEGAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE JAPANESE] (1967). In English see Takeyoshi 
Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, 7 LAW IN JAPAN 1
(Charles Stevens trans., 1974) (a translation of chaper four of the Japanese 
book). For a discussion of the importance of modernization theory in 
Kawashima’s work, see, e.g., ERIC A. FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN
JAPAN: LAW, SOCIETY, AND HEALTH POLICY 152-53 (2000). At the time of 
Kawashima’s work there was no example or model for a Non-Western society 
to develop a modern legal system that significantly deviates from established 
Western models. Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if he Stays 
with his Sheep? Justice in Rural China, 114 YALE L. J. 1675, 1701-02 (2005). 
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resulted in a lack of “rights consciousness” among Japanese at 
that time compared to the United States.14 Such a “lack,”
however, presumably should and would disappear once Japan 
“modernized.”15
Kawashima’s broad ruminations on the Japanese people’s 
general conception of law were supported primarily by anecdotes 
related to contract and property law against a background of low 
litigation rates.16 However, his work became wildly popular, 
14. See Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, 
supra note 13, at 15 (“In Japan…not only are there many instances where 
written agreements are not drafted, but even when written agreements are 
drafted their contents are generally very simple…When we compare this 
situation with the situation in European and American business 
transactions…we can understand the very conspicuous Japanese peculiarity in 
this regard.”). For an opposing view by a prominent Japanese law scholar that 
the supposed historical lack of legal consciousness is a myth, see Frank K. 
Upham, Weak Legal Consciousness as Invented Tradition, in MIRROR OF 
MODERNITY: INVENTED TRADITIONS IN MODERN JAPAN 48 (Stephen Vlastos ed., 
1998). 
15. Takeyoshi Kawashima, The Status of the Individual in the Notion of 
Law, Right, and Social Order in Japan, in THE JAPANESE MIND: ESSENTIALS OF
JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY (Charles A. Moore ed., 1967) (‘…it is clear that the 
Japanese attitude toward law, right, and social order will continue to undergo 
changes in the direction of the patterns of Western society…when the 
traditional social structure becomes disorganized as the process of 
industrialization proceeds.”), cited in FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 152.
16. See Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, 
supra note 13. An obvious problem is the selection of appropriate anecdotes, 
and indeed there are claims that even in Japan anecdotes could be cited to reach 
the opposite conclusion about the strong individuality and rationality of
Japanese legal consciousness. See YOSHIO SUGIMOTO & ROSS MOUER,
NIHONJIN WA NIHONTEKI KA? [ARE THE JAPANESE JAPANESE?], chapter 11 
(1982), cited in Setsuo Miyazawa, Taking Kawashima Seriously: A Review of 
Japanese Research on Japanese Legal Consciousness and Disputing Behavior,
21 LAW & SOC. REV. 219 (1987). Miyazawa equates “legal consciousness” in 
Japan with Lawrence Friedman’s concept of legal culture. He calls for more 
empirical research, not only on culture at the aggregate or societal level, but 
especially on individual attitudes with regard to law. Id. at 223. In one 
subsequent empirical study of individual attitudes towards contracts among 
Japanese law and business students, the authors found that, contrary to their 
original hypothesis, business students not trained in law took a more “legal” 
approach to contracts (i.e., favoring strict compliance over flexibility in 
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both within and outside Japan, in an exaggerated form that 
portrayed “culture” as an unchanging, dominant force that 
rendered law irrelevant.
Beginning with the seminal work of John Haley in 1978,17
Japanese law specialists soon challenged Kawashima’s theory 
with their own empirical efforts that focused on institutional 
barriers to litigation, economic analysis, and the role of 
bureaucratic controls.18 Although Kawashima’s emphasis on 
traditional values rather quickly lost influence among specialists 
interpretation and execution). See Michael K. Young et al., Japanese Attitudes 
Towards Contracts: An Empirical Wrinkle in the Debate, 34 GEO. WASH.
INT’L. REV. 789 (2002-2003). But see Salil K. Mehra, Blaming: Harm 
Attribution in the United States and Japan, 75 U. PITT. L. REV.__ (forthcoming 
2014) (finding that Japanese and Americans viewed accidents and blame for 
them in culturally distinct ways).
17. John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. 
JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978).
18. Japanese law specialists generally consider Kawashima’s thesis to 
be superseded by John Haley’s article in 1978 that focused on institutional 
barriers to litigation. See, e.g., Miyazawa, supra note 16, at 222. But see Eric A. 
Feldman, Law, Culture, and Conflict: Dispute Resolution in Postwar Japan, in
LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 50, 63 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007) (noting 
that Kawashima’s actual research is more complex than its popular 
characterization and that the seemingly contradictory arguments put forth by 
Kawashima and Haley can be considered as differences in emphasis rather than 
as being mutually exclusive).
Other analyses by Japanese law specialists emphasized economic 
analysis and informal bureaucratic controls over the importance of cultural 
values. For the former See, e.g., J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO,
JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH (1999) and J. Mark Ramseyer, 
Opinion and Comment, Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes 
in Japan, 14 J. JAPANESE STUD. 111 (1988). For the latter see FRANK K.
UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987) and Takao 
Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in 
Japan, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651 (1991). In addition to disagreeing with 
Kawashima’s thesis on the merits, Japanese law specialists also had a personal 
interest in refuting Kawashima’s approach since it denied the importance of the 
very field that Japanese law scholars were researching. See, e.g., J. Mark 
Ramseyer, John Haley and the American Discovery of Japanese Law, 8 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 213, 215 (2009) (stating that “In Kawashima’s 
crudely reductionist world, American scholars of Japanese law did not need to 
learn the law. After all, legal rules made no difference.”)
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in Japanese law, European-based generalists in comparative law 
have continued to propound Kawashima’s essentialist view of 
culture for decades. General comparativists continue to compare 
legal doctrine between the U.S. and Europe, but resort to cultural 
classifications for Non-Western legal systems.19 Japan has been 
variously classified as traditionalist, Far Eastern, Confucian, and 
“other.”20 The divide between generalists in comparative law and 
specialists in Japanese law with respect to approaches for 
analyzing Japanese law and society, noted by Frank Upham in 
1997, has only grown worse.21 Japan specialists have continued 
to develop their field with a socio-legal approach, while general 
comparativists seemingly remain stuck with a legal Orientalism 
from the 1960s and 70s.22
The purpose here is not to deny the existence of culture, but 
rather to exercise great caution with respect to any essentialist 
“grand principle” that is difficult to define and even harder to 
apply to concrete modern phenomena with any consistency. The 
aspect of Japanese culture that generally receives the most 
attention relates to the importance of social relationships, which 
is often portrayed as trumping universalistic principles such as 
those embodied in law.23
The best effort to date to define a theory of law in Japan 
focused on social relations is John Haley’s portrayal of Japan’s
19. See generally Frank K. Upham, The Place of Japanese Legal 
Studies in American Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 639, 644, 654 
(1997).
20. Id. at 646-47. 
21. Id. at 652; Georgio Fabio Colombo, Japan as a Victim of 
Comparative Law, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 731 (2014).
22. “Legal Orientalism” is a phrase used extensively by Teemu 
Ruskola to describe similar issues of Western stereotypes of a lack of law in 
China. See TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES,
AND MODERN LAW (2013). 
23. See Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, 
supra note 13, at 19-20. For a current example of this traditional approach, see 
Steven Givens, The Vagaries of Vagueness: An Essay on “Cultural” vs. 
“Institutional” Approaches to Japanese Law, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 839 
(2014). 
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“communitarianism.”24 But does Japan’s supposed social 
cohesion truly relate back to village relationships during Japan’s
medieval Tokugawa period? This claim remains hard to 
evaluate, and efforts to apply any such general theory to specific 
modern phenomena encounter serious difficulties.25. In addition, 
this theory represents only one aspect of Haley’s ongoing 
sophisticated work on various aspects of change and continuity 
in Japan. He also, for example, finds it impossible to separate 
law and culture, with each influencing the other.26
It is worth noting that in the early 1990s this argument about 
Japanese culture and communitarianism expanded further into a 
discussion of “Asian values.” This viewpoint, most closely 
associated with the former leader of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, 
emphasized Asian communitarianism in contrast to Western 
24. See JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (1998).
Unlike some of the exaggerated notions of culture discussed herein, Haley, the 
leading writer on the interaction of law and culture in Japan views law and 
culture as “inseparable” rather that as competing forces. John Owen Haley, 
Comment, Law and Culture in China and Japan: A Framework for Analysis,
MICH. J. INT’L. L. 895, 896 (2006). In his view, not only does culture influence 
law, but “both lawmaking and legal enforcement inexorably influence the 
continuity and change of culture.” Id.
25. Tom Ginsburg, Studying Japanese Law Because It’s There, 58 AM.
J. COMP. L. 15, 21-22 (2010); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce for the 
Japanese Soul? Courts, Corporations, and Communities—A Comment on 
Haley’s View of Japanese Law, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345 (2009).
For example, one might expect litigation rates to be higher in Japan’s urban 
areas as traditional, village-based community bonds are weakened through 
migration to urban areas; however, this has not proven to be the case. See Tom 
Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis 
of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 44-45 (2006).
26. See John O. Haley, Law and Culture in China and Japan: A 
Framework for Analysis, supra note 24. See also, e.g., Eric A. Feldman, The 
Culture of Legal Change: A Case Study of Tobacco Control in Twenty-First 
Century Japan, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 743 (2006). In addition, Dan Foote has 
produced a number of interesting articles that highlight how the judiciary and 
formal legal system are, in fact, harnessed to promote “traditional” values that 
are often assumed to be cultural and unrelated to law. See, e.g., Daniel Foote, 
Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the Service of 
– Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635 (1996).
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individualism.27 In addition to the obvious questions of whether 
there is a sufficiently uniform Asian culture to support such a 
thesis and whether that culture played an important role in 
economic development and modernization, the “Asian values”
argument was also attacked by many critics as an excuse to 
justify authoritarianism.28 In any event, the pendulum soon 
swung again, and the popularity of the “Asian values” argument 
declined significantly following the Asian financial crisis of 
1997-98.29
The above example illustrates that the tendency to rely on 
cultural stereotypes in discussions of law is by no means unique 
to Japan. The rapid rise and “success” of China over the last 
decade has made that country the new battleground over cultural 
stereotypes and the role of law in non-Western countries. The 
corresponding stereotypes of Japan and China have been 
succinctly summarized thusly: “decisions about law in Japan are 
guided by norms of harmony” and “Confucian China will/will 
not respect the rule of law.”30
As a thought experiment, let us consider what would happen 
if a Japanese (or other foreign) observer attempted to analyze 
current issues in American society through a similar approach of 
first identifying an American “essence.” Presumably the 
American “essence” would relate somehow to individualism:
maximization of individual freedom, with perhaps a reference to 
colonists fleeing to the United States to escape persecution and 
rugged frontier individualism. There might be a corresponding 
limited role for government with respect to both individuals and 
markets.
27. Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A Conservation with Lee Kwan 
Yew, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 109, 113 (1994). 
28. For a review of this debate, see, e.g., Karen Engle, Culture And 
Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate In Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 291 (2000).
29. See Mark R. Thompson, Whatever Happened to Asian Values?, 12 
J. DEMOCRACY 154, (2001).
30. See Nicholas C. Howson & Mark D. West, Law, Norms, and Legal 
Change: Global and Local in China and Japan, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 687,
692 (2005).
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Could such an “essence” of individualism be used as the main 
framework for analyzing current issues such as gun control, 
health care, fiscal policy, bank regulation, or immigration? Any 
such approach would immediately encounter the inconvenient
fact that the concept of individualism is broad and amorphous, 
and that beliefs and attitudes can be affected by many factors and 
can change relatively rapidly. For example, the most 
controversial issue in the United States in the early fall of 2013 is 
arguments over the budget, debt ceiling, and defunding the 
Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”). Unsurprisingly, both sides 
to this debate regularly cite works of the nation’s Founding 
Fathers to show that the bedrock principles of the American 
republic support their own respective positions.31 Individualism 
and opportunity might be thought to lead to a relatively open 
immigration policy, but there are periodic backlashes against 
such a position with changing economic and other conditions 
and some attitudes may have changed as recently as the 
Republican party’s defeat in the 2012 presidential election.32
In sum, not only is society constantly changing, but so are 
views of history and interpretation of broad principles, as they 
both reflect current issues and changing needs. It is therefore 
exceedingly difficult to find an unchanging, broad social or 
cultural principle to utilize for analysis of specific contemporary 
issues. 
31. See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold, Founding Fathers weigh in on 
Obamacare (with the help of today’s statesmen), WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2013, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (noting that it was “a busy week 
for the Founding Fathers. In the debate that led up to the shutdown, legislators 
name-checked at least . . . 28 of the 56 signers of the Declaration of 
Independence.”).
32. And may have subsequently changed back again, as rising 
Republican prospects in the 2014 mid-term elections may have cooled ardor for 
immigration reform. See, e.g., John Dickerson, Back From the Dead: A Year 
Ago Immigration Reform was Crucial for Many Republicans; That was Before 
They Felt Confident about 2014, SLATE, March 18, 2014, available at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/03/reince_prieb
us_immigration_reform_and_gop_autopsy_why_republicans_are_ignoring.htm
l. 
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II. THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF LAW IN JAPAN
Perceptions about the role of law in Japan have been 
significantly affected by our preoccupation with cultural 
explanations of Japanese society, resulting in a longstanding 
view that “law doesn’t matter” in Japan. This view has persisted 
throughout the pendulum swing in our perception of Japan’s
success and failure. 
During the 1980s the purported lack of law was cited 
positively as a reason for Japan’s success. The Japanese focus on 
business, engineering, informal cooperative relationships, and an 
active role for government bureaucrats, were all seen as being 
superior to America’s preoccupation with rules, lawyers, legal 
formalities, and litigation.
It is interesting to observe how perceptions of a lack of law in 
Japan managed to persist through Japan’s period of “failure.”
Like bureaucracy and cultural “uniqueness,” a supposed lack of 
law that had previously been cited as a key to Japan’s impressive 
“success” was now deemed to be a cause of failure. The 
persistence of our image that “law doesn’t matter” in Japan may 
again have colored our evaluation of Japan’s efforts to institute 
major reforms in the 1990s. For example, there is little 
disagreement that “law on the books” did change substantially in 
areas such as financial deregulation under Japan’s “Big Bang”
program. However, it was presumed that changes in the law did 
not matter; actual practices in the area of financial regulation did 
not change because of government bureaucrats’ unwillingness to 
give up control of financial institutions. Japan’s continuing low 
economic growth was cited as proof of this proposition. The 
notion that law doesn’t matter in Japan survived intact despite 
substantially changed circumstances.33
33. See Bruce E Aronson, Reassessing Japan’s Big Bang: Twenty 
Years of Financial Regulatory Reform, in JAPAN SINCE 1945: FROM POSTWAR 
TO POST-BUBBLE 165, 170, 172 (Christopher Gerteis & Timothy S. George 
eds., 2013) (arguing that Japan’s Big Bang financial deregulation program and 
accompanying administrative reform were a real, if partial success, contrary to 
popular views of failure).
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In fact, the legal system was one of the major areas of reform 
in Japan’s ambitious plans to undertake deregulation and 
administrative reform initiated toward the end of the 1990s.34
Traditional cultural stereotypes of harmony and consensus were 
further challenged by one of the overarching goals of reform: to 
transform Japan from a system of ex ante procedures (decided in 
advance by government bureaucrats through administrative 
guidance) to an ex post system (decided after the fact through 
interpretation and enforcement of legal rules). Although it is 
difficult to measure success in any such broad endeavor, the 
reforms had a substantial impact. The unexpected rise of large 
corporate law firms in Japan and the expanded role of corporate 
lawyers suggest that more Japanese businessmen who wished to 
know whether a new product or service was permissible began 
consulting lawyers for interpretation of legal rules rather than 
visiting bureaucrats for advance approval.35
Law remains an important tool today to implement policies 
designed to revitalize Japan. Every element of the Abe 
administration’s growth policy will require substantial legal 
implementation. These include expanding the workforce to 
combat an aging society by increasing the role of women, 
providing incentives to stimulate the growth of emerging 
34. Id. at 167. For the substance of the legal reform proposal, see
JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, Recommendations of the Justice System 
Reform Council, ch. III, pt. 1–1 (2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/
foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html (report of a special legal reform council 
created by the Japanese Cabinet). For an overview of the legal reform process, 
see, e.g., Setsuo Miyazawa, Law Reform, Lawyers, and Access to Justice, in
JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW (Gerald Paul McAlinn ed., 2007) (illustrating an 
overview of the legal reform process).
35. See, e.g., Bruce E. Aronson, The Brave New World of Lawyers in 
Japan: Proceedings of a Panel Discussion on the Growth of Corporate Law 
Firms and the Role of Lawyers in Japan, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 45, 75, 78 
(2007). See also Toshimitsu Kitagawa & Luke Nottage, Globalization of 
Japanese Corporations and the Development of Corporate Legal Departments: 
Problems and Prospects, in RAISING THE BAR: THE EMERGING LEGAL 
PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA 201, 246 (William P. Alford ed., 2007).
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companies, and entering into the Trans-Pacific Partnership to 
increase trade and investment.36
It is difficult to prove my sense that law plays an important 
role in Japanese society, although perhaps not as large a role as 
in the United States. As with research on litigation rates, it may 
prove to be the case that the legalistic U.S. is, in fact, the outlier
and that Japan, on the basis of a broader comparison of 
industrialized societies, is actually a “normal” country. The 
continuing development of Asia and substantial increases in 
intraregional economic, academic, and cultural interactions
provide new and important opportunities for collaborative 
comparative research between Japan and other Asian countries 
that share some historical, institutional, and cultural features.
This may also clear the way for comparisons that do not 
necessarily utilize the U.S. or other Western countries, with their 
strong cultural stereotypes of Asia, as an explicit or implicit 
standard for comparison.37
36. HEADQUARTERS FOR JAPAN’S ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION, JAPAN 
REVITALIZATION STRATEGY: JAPAN IS BACK (June 14, 2013), available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/en_saikou_jpn_hon.pdf.
37. The economic rise and modernization of Asia presents a new 
opportunity (and challenge) for the Academy to undertake comparative studies 
of legal systems in Asia, rather than comparing a single system in Asia to the 
United States or other Western country. The important potential benefits of 
such comparisons include providing both greater context and understanding of 
legal systems in each country and suggesting alternative approaches to dealing 
with common problems. For a few examples of this approach in my area of 
corporate law and corporate governance, see, e.g., Hideki Kanda, What Shapes 
Corporate Law in Japan, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST 
ASIA (Hideki Kanda et al., 2008); Harald Baum & Dan W. Puchniak, The 
Derivative Action: An Economic, Historical and Practice-oriented Approach, in 
THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH (Dan Puchniak et al., 2012). For my own modest contribution to this 
collaborative effort, see Bruce E. Aronson, Corporate Governance Models and 
Practices in Japan and East Asia: Proceedings of a Panel Discussion (27 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L., forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2395059.
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III. APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF JAPANESE LAW AND
SOCIETY
A.Treating Japan as a Normal Country
If, as argued above, analysis of Japanese law is hindered by 
broad and oversimplified perceptions, what approach should 
researchers take? The first principle is to treat Japan as a 
“normal” country, i.e., use the same research methodologies that 
would be used for any country. This would include an effort to 
cut through the pendulum swings in perceptions about Japan’s
success and failure38 and disregard the tendency to provide broad 
cultural explanations.
One of the best examples of this approach is John Haley’s
seminal work, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, which early on 
used modern, well-accepted methodological approaches to deal 
effectively with a culturally laden issue.39 It looks at the 
available evidence and shows no particular assumption about 
Japanese “culture.”40 Through the 1980s, differing approaches to 
38. Or, in the words of Japan historian Stephen Vlastos, to “strike the 
mean: to see through the trends of the day to ways in which Japan is really 
quite ordinary.” Stephen Vlastos, Bookending Postwar Japan: Seeing a Whole 
Greater than the Sum of its Parts, in JAPAN SINCE 1945: FROM POSTWAR TO 
POST-BUBBLE, supra note 37, at 257, 258.
39. Haley, supra note 18. See also Ramseyer, John Haley and the 
American Discovery of Japanese Law, supra note 18. For specific examples, 
see infra note 44. 
40. Haley’s article remains the gold standard for comparative studies 
due to its integration of three highly useful approaches. First, Haley used 
empirical data to challenge conventional wisdom. His data indicated that it was 
a lack of legal infrastructure rather than a cultural predisposition against the use 
of litigation that accounted for relatively low litigation rates in Japan. Haley, 
supra note 18 at 378-89. Second, he employed a historical perspective, arguing, 
for example, that if conciliation procedures were made mandatory in the 
interwar years for the purpose of suppressing litigation and societal upheaval 
dating from the 1920s, it was unlikely that a cultural reluctance to litigate was 
the cause of a decline in litigation in the postwar years. Id. at 368-78. Third, he 
looked beyond a bilateral comparison between the United States and Japan to 
examine available data on litigation from a variety of countries, concluding that 
while Japanese litigation rates were low, they were not extraordinarily so; if 
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the study of Japanese law by scholars such as Mark Ramseyer 
and Frank Upham shared the common characteristic of utilizing 
standard research methodologies to analyze Japan without 
reliance on any essentialist cultural explanation.41 Thus, for 
several decades scholars in Japanese law have treated Japan as a 
“normal” country.
B. Providing Context for Understanding Japanese Law 
and Society
Researchers on Japanese law and society can utilize their 
expertise and experience to contribute to the understanding of 
Japan by providing context. In comparative studies the two 
extremes are generally not very useful. An emphasis on cultural 
uniqueness means that any findings cannot be utilized in other 
societies. Conversely, an emphasis on a universal principle such 
as economic rationality tends to make all societies look alike. In 
either case, the value of comparative research is called into 
question.42
For meaningful comparisons, scholars can aim for the middle 
ground between these two extremes, examining both similarities 
and differences and providing useful context that both deepens 
understanding and suggests potential alternative approaches to 
formulating policies and solving problems. Under this view,
people are “rational” but only in the sense of a bounded 
anything, the United States was the outlier due to its unusually high rate of 
litigation. Id. at 362-64.
41. See supra note 18 for citations.
42. The logical result is an ongoing “crisis” in general comparative law 
which includes the view that comparisons are essentially useless. See, e.g.,
Pierre Legrand, The Same and the Different, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES:
TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 240, 245 (Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday 
eds., 2004) (arguing that “…as he engages with his (impossible) object of 
study, ‘the comparati[st] presumes similarities in different jurisdictions in the 
very act of searching for them’ and assumes differentiating features to be 
largely indifferent. The desire for sameness breeds the expectation of sameness 
which, in turn, begets the finding of sameness.” (emphasis in original)) ; Günter 
Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 411-55 (1985); Upham, supra note 19, at 650.
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rationality that is largely defined by their societal context. In 
defining this societal context, the trend in the literature on 
Japanese law has been to look first at the effect of institutions 
and to be wary of “culture” due to its overemphasis and abuse in 
the past.43 However, the persistence of institutions is itself an 
indication of shared values or “culture,” and “institutions” and 
“culture” can be viewed as complementary components of 
societal context rather than as opposing or competing 
explanations.44
It is easy to find significant issues in contemporary Japan 
where defining and explaining the context is essential. For 
example, take the important issue of constitutional revision. In 
the abstract, it does not sound particularly controversial for Japan 
to recognize a right of collective self-defense in its constitution, 
as permitted by the UN charter and as claimed by virtually all 
nations. However, the Japanese context involves historical 
aggression against other countries in Asia that is still denied by 
Japanese nationalists and remains an issue today, as well as 
domestic political issues involving past militarism and the nature 
of a democratic society.45 Providing such context does not 
automatically mean that constitutional revision is unwise.
However, fully understanding the Japanese context permits fuller 
43. Some argue that a number of Japanese law specialists may have 
gone too far in the opposite direction in an attempt to avoid overly broad use of 
the term “culture”—i.e., by expanding the concept of “institutions” so broadly 
as to make its use equally problematic. David T. Johnson, Law in Everyday 
Japan: Sex, Sumo, Suicide, and Statutes by Mark D. West Review, 32 J. 
JAPANESE STUD. 444, 445 (stating that the use of the concept of “institution” by 
Mark West in his book LAW IN EVERYDAY JAPAN: SEX, SUMO, SUICIDE, AND 
STATUTES “is so broad that it is difficult to discern anything important that is 
excluded from its confines”). 
44. See, e.g., Carl J. Green, Japan: “The Rule of Law Without 
Lawyers” Reconsidered, reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES,
CODES, AND COMMENTARY (Curtis J. Milhaupt et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2012) 179, 
181. See also Haley, supra note 24, at 896.
45. For a general introduction to the history and role of Japan’s modern 
constitutions, see LAWRENCE W. BEER & JOHN M. MAKI, FROM IMPERIAL MYTH 
TO DEMOCRACY: JAPAN’S TWO CONSTITUTIONS, 1889-2002 (2002).
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comprehension of the implications and consequences, both 
domestic and international, of such choices.46
C. Continuing Development of the Field of Japanese Law
By the late 1980s the field of Japanese law had moved well 
beyond essentialist cultural stereotypes, and for several decades 
Japanese law specialists have regarded any discussion of 
essentialist culture as both fruitless and anachronistic.47 The field 
has continued to develop in two ways. First, a number of Japan 
46. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) created a draft of a 
substantially amended constitution in 2012 that goes far beyond amendment of 
the pacifist provision in Article 9 to seemingly “turn back the clock” to a 
“controlled society.” See Japan’s Constitution: Back to the Future, ECONOMIST,
June 1, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21578712-
shinzo-abes-plan-rewrite-japans-constitution-running-trouble-back-future. For 
a discussion of the most controversial proposed amendments see, for example, 
Lawrence Repeta, Japan’s Democracy at Risk – The LDP’s Ten Most 
Dangerous Proposals for Constitutional Change, 11 ASIA-PAC. J.: JAPAN 
FOCUS, Issue 28, No. 3, available at http://japanfocus.org/-Lawrence-
Repeta/3969#. For the international implications of such constitutional 
amendments, see, for example, Yuka Hayashi, Japan Leader Charts Path for 
Military’s Rise: Abe Seeks to Leverage Legislative Strength to Remake Pacifist, 
World War II-Era Constitution, a Proposal Riling Tokyo’s Neighbors, WALL 
ST. J., April 24, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10
001424127887323551004578438253084917008?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB100014241278873235510045784
38253084917008.html#printMode?KEYWORDS=YUKA+HAYASHI. A 
likely alternative to a constitutional amendment is a new “official” government 
interpretation of Article 9 to permit Japan to engage in collective self-defense. 
However, even this scenario is controversial. See, e.g., Craig Martin, The Case 
Against “Revising Interpretations” of the Japanese Constitution, ASIA-PAC. J.:
JAPAN FOCUS (Jan. 31, 2014, 7:02 AM), http://japanfocus.org/-craig-
martin/2434 (arguing that the courts, not the government, have the 
constitutional authority in Japan to interpret constitutional provisions).
47. In the mid-1990s, Frank Upham called the approach of European-
oriented comparativists that relied on cultural explanations to categorize non-
Western legal systems as “anathema” and “bizarre” to scholars of Japanese law.
See Upham, supra note 19, at 656 Writing nearly a decade ago, Kent Anderson 
called the relevance of law in Japan a “hackneyed” question. See Kent 
Anderson, Review Essay, The Next Generation: Milhaupt and West on 
Japanese Economic Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 985, 1000 (2006).
2014] My Key Phrase for Understanding Japanese Law 835
experts in sociology of law have developed more complex and 
sophisticated arguments about the relationship of law and 
culture. These include, for example, emphasis on the fact that 
culture is not unchanging, but rather is constantly being 
reimagined, being both fluid and negotiable, and is utilized 
selectively and strategically;48 and characterizations of culture as 
not being determinative, but rather as acting as an important 
filter in determining both which Western laws to adapt and how 
to adapt Western legal concepts to local circumstances.49
A second, and perhaps more significant development, is 
research in fields other than sociology of law that ignores 
cultural stereotypes, assumes that law matters in Japan, and 
proceeds to examine how law influences economic and other 
actors in Japan. This work is exemplified by Curtis Milhaupt and 
Mark West, who also pay heed to the influence of social norms, 
which could be regarded as a non-essentialist form of 
“culture.”50 In fact, such a “hybrid” approach, which combines 
social norms, institutional structures and law to analyze the role 
of law in Japan is now the dominant methodology employed by 
Japanese law scholars.51
Despite this ongoing, sophisticated research, cultural 
stereotypes continue to dominate the thinking of general legal 
comparativists, let alone the general public. Certainly, Japanese 
law specialists should continue their current methodological 
48. See Setsuo Miyazawa, How Does Culture Count in Legal Change?:
A Review with a Proposal from a Social Movement Perspective, 27 MICH. J.
INT’L. L. 917 (2006).
49. See Takao Tanase, Global Markets and the Evolution of Law in 
China and Japan, MICH. J. INT’L. L. 873 (2006); Miyazawa, supra note 48, at 
917. 
50. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The 
Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2083 (2001); MARK D. WEST, SECRETS, SEX, AND SPECTACLE: THE RULES 
OF SCANDAL IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (2006). See also Anderson, 
supra note 47.
51. For a few examples out of many, see, e.g., Feldman, supra note 26;
Luke Nottage, Japan’s New Arbitration Law: Domestic Reinforcing 
Internationalisation?, 2 INT’L. ARB. L. REV. 54 (2004) (considering a variety of 
possible explanations for the relative failure of domestic arbitration in Japan).
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approach to research on Japanese law, having already largely 
overcome the problems cited in this essay. However, the greater 
and more significant challenge at this stage is what scholars in 
the field of Japanese law (as well as legal specialists in other 
non-Western countries such as China) should do to try and exert 
some meaningful influence on generalists’ (mis)perceptions of 
the role of law in Japan.
It is both too great a burden and completely unrealistic to 
expect that generalists in comparative law, let alone the general 
public, will take the initiative to become familiar with the work 
of Japanese (and other) legal specialists in order to move beyond 
outdated and unhelpful cultural stereotypes. The only practical 
method for making progress in closing the gap between 
specialists and generalists is for scholars in Japanese (and Asian) 
law to take the initiative. It is therefore difficult to argue with the 
recommendations of Setsuo Miyazawa, leader of the East Asian 
Law and Society collaborative research network, who advises 
that researchers in East Asia should help generalists understand 
the value of their work and contribute to general theory-building 
by presenting work that is not bound conceptually by national or 
regional boundaries, and should also seek to present to, and 
collaborate with, generalists as much as possible.52
CONCLUSION
Understanding of Japanese law has been hindered by 
lingering perceptions in other academic disciplines and in 
broader society that overemphasize cultural explanations and 
exaggerate Japan’s “success” or “failure” as explanations for the 
role of law in Japan. Japanese law scholars have challenged 
these assumptions and have gone on to develop an interesting 
and valuable literature in their field, but this work has had only 
limited impact on broader academic disciplines and society.
52. Setsuo Miyazawa, Where are We Now and Where Should We Head 
for? A Reflection on the Place of East Asia on the Map of Socio-legal Studies,
22 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 113 (2013).
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Going forward, we should continue to resist the notion of 
finding one “grand principle” that defines the “essence” of 
Japan. Rather we should continue to use accepted academic 
methodologies and treat Japan as a “normal” country, while 
explaining the Japanese context within which socio-legal
comparisons must take place. The issues and possible solutions 
discussed herein are by no means unique to Japan; they apply 
equally to other Asian and non-Western countries. However, 
Japan was the first to develop and, as a result, the role of law in 
Japan was arguably the first field of legal studies in modern 
times to deal with these issues. Hopefully, we can continue to 
develop the field and provide an example to, and increase 
collaboration with, specialists on other Asian and non-Western
countries, and also encourage and collaborate more closely with 
our general comparativist colleagues in their ongoing struggle to 
make fruitful comparisons of law and society.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
